Recently, Das et al. proposed a dynamic ID-based verifierfree password authentication scheme using smart cards. To resist the IDtheft attack, the user's login ID is dynamically generated and one-time used. Herein, we demonstrate that Das et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, in which the adversary can easily impersonate any user to login the server at any time. Furthermore, we also show several minor weaknesses of Das et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
Password authentication is a popular approach to authenticate users logining any kind of server. A common feature of conventional password authentication schemes is that a verification table, which contains the verifiers of users' passwords, should be securely stored in the server. If the verification table is stolen or modified by the adversary, the system will be breached. Therefore, many password authentication schemes without storing verifiers in the server have been proposed, e.g., [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] , [7] - [11] , [13] - [17] , and each has its pros and cons. Since the user's login identity (ID) is static in these verifier-free schemes, it is possible that the user's static login ID may leak partial information about the user's login messages so that the adversary can use it to forge the user's login messages by some subtle means. To avoid such a risk, Das et al. [18] recently proposed a dynamic ID-based verifier-free password authentication scheme using smart cards. To resist the IDtheft attack, the user's login ID is dynamically generated and one-time used. In addition, users can freely choose and change their passwords. Das et al. claimed that their scheme can withstand the stolen verifier attack, the reply attack, the forgery attack, the guessing attack, and the insider attack. Unfortunately, we find that Das et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, in which the adversary can easily impersonate any user to login the server at any time. Furthermore, Das et al.'s scheme has several minor weaknesses: potential vulnerability to an insider attack, no user eviction mechanism, and poor reparability [3] . In this letter, we will first review Das et al.'s scheme and then describe its weaknesses. 
Review of Das et al.'s Scheme
For readers' convenience, we first review Das et al.'s scheme [18] before demonstrating its weaknesses. The notations used throughout this letter are summarized as follows:
• U i denotes the user.
• CID i denotes the dynamic login ID of U i .
• PW i denotes the password of U i .
• S denotes the remote server.
• x denotes a secret key of S .
• y denotes a secret number of S .
• h() represents a one-way hash function.
• ⊕ represents the bitwise XOR operation.
• ⇒ represents a secure channel.
• → represents a common channel.
Das et al.'s scheme involves the registration phase, the login phase, the verification phase, and the password change phase, which can be described as in the following.
Registration Phase
This phase is invoked when U i requests to register with S .
Step R1. U i freely chooses his password PW i .
Step R2. U i ⇒ S : PW i .
Step
Step R4. S ⇒ U i : PW i and a smart card containing h(), N i , and y.
Login Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i requests to login S .
Step L1. U i inserts his smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal, and then enters PW i .
Step L2. U i 's smart card computes
where T denotes the current timestamp.
Step L3. U i 's smart card computes
Step L4. This phase is invoked whenever S receives U i 's login request.
Step V1. If T is invalid, S rejects U i 's login request.
Step V2. S computes CID i ⊕ h(N i ⊕ y ⊕ T ), which yields h(PW i ), and then computes h(CID i ⊕ h(PW i )) to derive B i .
Step V3. S computes h(T ⊕ N i ⊕ B i ⊕ y). If the computed result equals the received C i , S accepts U i 's login request. Otherwise, S rejects U i 's login request and terminates this session.
Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i requests to change his password with a new one, say PW
Step C1. U i inserts his smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal, and then enters PW i and requests to change his password.
Step C2. U i enters PW
, and then his smart card computes N
Step C3. U i 's smart card updates N i with N (new) i .
An Impersonation Attack
Assume that an adversary has intercepted one of U i 's previous login messages, say {CID i , N i , C i , T }. If the adversary attempts to impersonate U i to login S at time T (> T ), an impersonation attack can be performed as in the following:
Step A1. The adversary computes ∆t = T ⊕ T and N i = N i ⊕ ∆t.
Step A2. Adversary → S :
Step A3. Since T is valid, i.e., fresh, S will proceed to compute
Step A4.
Since the computed result equals the received C i , S accepts the adversary's login request.
By generalizing the above attack, the adversary can easily impersonate any user to login S at any time.
Minor Weaknesses
In this section, we will show that Das et al.'s scheme also has several minor weaknesses as follows.
Vulnerability to Insider Attack
U i 's password PW i will be revealed to S during Step R1. In practice, it is likely that U i uses the same password PW i to login several servers for his convenience. In this case, the insider, e.g., the administrator, of S can try to use PW i to impersonate U i to login other servers that adopt normal remote user password authentication schemes.
No User Eviction Mechanism
If U i has been evicted from S , he still can login S because S can not distinguish the evictees from the users that are not evicted. If S has to maintain a blacklist to record all the evictees, it may violate the original expectation for verifierfree password authentication schemes.
Poor Reparability
Many researchers have shown that the secrets stored in a smart card can be breached by monitoring the power consumption, e.g., [6] , or analyzing the leaked information, e.g., [12] . If the adversary has obtained the y stored in the user's smart card, he can forge a login message that can pass S 's verification as follows. The adversary first randomly chooses two values, HPW i and N i , and then computes
where T is the current timestamp. Next, the adversary computes
As the received T is valid, S will compute CID i ⊕ h(N i ⊕ y ⊕ T ), which yields HPW i , and then compute h(
Since the computed result equals the received C i , S will accept the adversary's login request. Unfortunately, such a fraud can not be prohibited unless S replaces y with a new one and updates the y stored in the smart card of each user. Clearly, the reparability [3] of Das et al.'s scheme is poor.
Conclusion
Das et al.'s dynamic ID-based verifier-free password authentication scheme is novel in that the user's login ID is dynamically generated and one-time used to withstand the ID-theft attack. Herein, we have shown that Das et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack and an insider attack, and is not easily reparable. In addition, we have pointed out that Das et al.'s scheme does not specify the user eviction mechanism that should be provided in practice.
